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alterity and the maternal in
adoptee phenomenology
jane lymer

The feeling that something is missing
never, ever leaves you—and it can’t, and it
shouldn’t, because something is missing …
Adoption is outside. You act out what it feels
like to be the one who doesn’t belong.
—Jeanette Winterson, Why be happy
when you can be normal
Do a psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the flesh,
the mother.
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible
and the Invisible

The project that I embark upon in this paper is an enquiry into the role of the
maternal body in the development of alterity in the child. I begin by drawing on
a previous publication in Parrhesia, where I explore the phenomenology of the
maternal-foetal affective relation through the philosophy of Maurice MerleauPonty, outlining how the foetal body schema develops through maternally

structured movement while in utero.1 In that paper, I described the maternalfoetal relation in terms of accouplement—an embodied coupling entailing an
affective substratum, which moulds foetal ipsiety. I also identified that within
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, the place of maternal alterity in the development of
foetal ipsiety is underestimated. There is no requirement, within Merleau-Ponty’s
theory of infant development, or his ontology of the flesh, for the biological
mother to be a primal alterity that scaffolds the development of the child. In
this paper I attempt to further explore this notion of the biological mother as a
primal alterity and what this might mean for Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology and
our understandings of subjectivity more generally. As we shall see as this paper
unfolds, it is in the taking up of the stereotype of the passive and all giving mother
where Merleau-Ponty most errs in his assessment of developmental alterity.
In the Sorbonne Lectures he describes pregnancy as “an anonymous process
which happens through her and of which she is only the seat.”2 Being the passive
recipient, the container in which the foetus grows through the power of nature,
denies the necessity of maternal interaction and engagement with the foetus as
necessary for foetal flourishing.
I begin by drawing on maternal-infant bonding and attachment theory which
recognises that a mother or primary caregiver is required in order to scaffold the
development of alterity in the child. It has been accepted since the 1950s that
children need a particular carer with which to form an affective bond in order to
cognitively flourish.3 Through the study of institutionalised children, John Bowlby,
the pioneer of bonding theory, was able to show that children not given the
opportunity to bond develop autism like symptoms which increase in severity the
longer a child is isolated from family life (a condition now referred to as reactive
attachment disorder or RAD). Infants are most at risk of permanent cognitive
impairment, should they remain institutionalised beyond the sixth month of age.
Maternal-infant bonding has been thought to develop from birth, so when a child
is adopted, early placement within the adopting family is advocated in order to
facilitate the bonding process. However, it has been identified that, although the
cognitive impairment experienced by institutionalised infants is usually avoided by
adoption, adoptees nonetheless take a different developmental pathway than their
non-adopted counterparts. Although only recently acknowledged, psychologists
have long suspected issues with adoption after a series of studies which date back
to the 1970s, correlated adoption with psychological vulnerability and learning
difficulties.4 Just why adoptees might developmentally face more obstacles than
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non-adopted children remains unclear, and although the research does indicate
that there is ‘something’ about being adopted that sets the adoptee apart, just
what this ethereal something is, is yet to be clearly defined. I think Ronald Nydam
describes adoptee phenomenology best when he states that “adoptees can grow
up well, but they grow up differently. They must inevitably follow an unusual
developmental pathway as they attend to the sound of that dissonant echo”.5
In this paper, my primary concern with adoptee phenomenology is to begin the
process of trying to understand this ‘dissonant echo’ and one of the conclusions
that I draw is that the experience of alterity both in the self and of others in the
adoptee disrupts the ‘at birth’ notion of infant bonding and attachment, leaving
us with questions about the role of the biological mother in infant cognitive
development.
From the outset of this project I want to make it clear that it is not my intention
to pathologise adoptee phenomenology. Although sadly, disproportionate
percentages of adoptees experience difficulties growing up it is unclear if this
is the result of the presumption, both medically and culturally, that an adoptee
ought to be ‘normal’. The failure to recognise ‘adoption’ as an alternative
embodiment could in and of itself contribute to the psychological vulnerability
identified, making life far more difficult than it might otherwise be for those
who have been adopted. Many personal accounts of adoptee experience, such as
Jeanette Winterson’s biography Why be Happy when you can Be Normal, tell of
adoptees who negotiate their difference, their sense of ‘abnormality’, in reflective
and insightful ways.6 As one researcher discovered, adoptees do not suffer lower
than average intelligence, and often will be high achievers.7 What appears to cause
the greatest amount of difficulty is in the negotiation of alterity, both within the
self and with others, and the awareness by many adoptees that they are different
to their counterparts without knowing why. In terms of this project what I wish
to take from adoptee phenomenology is the premise that something is different,
that this something appears to be founded in the adoption process and results in
differences and often difficulties in the negotiation of alterity both within the self
and with others, even in cases where adoption has occurred at birth, where family
life was healthy, and sadly, where all too often, the adoptee will only discover later
in life that they were adopted.
In the final section of this paper, I situate this phenomenology back into MerleauPonty’s flesh ontology. Drawing upon Luce Irigaray’s critique of The Visible and
the Invisible, I agree that Merleau-Ponty appropriates the maternal body in his
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model of the flesh, and that it is this denial that allows us to imagine ourselves
as individuated, but I question her claim that this translates into an overarching
denial of sexual difference, if only because we are all born and we all forget
our birth.8 For Irigaray, the inability to see the other sex within phallocentric
philosophies in general emerges out of the invisibility of the corporeal prenatal
condition and the inability to see the mother as the source or origin of existence
underpins the inability to acknowledge the existence of a sex different from, and
incommensurable with, the subject. Drawing upon metaphors of fluidity and
absorption rather than a womb which nourishes through amniotic fluid, and in
giving precedence to vision over touch, Merleau-Ponty, according to Irigaray,
appropriates, yet denies the maternal body which encases and nourishes the
foetus, a relation that for Irigaray leaves a ‘watermark’ etched into the subject’s
body.
In acknowledging foetal and adoptee phenomenology, I conclude this paper with
the speculation that perhaps this watermark, of which Irigaray speaks, might well
be what Nydam describes as a dissonant echo, and if so, this leaves us with the
question of whether Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology is actually a phenomenology
of gestation. In other words, the question of whether the maternal-foetal
accouplement that I have described is the ontology which Merleau-Ponty claims
as “a prototype of Being”9, a flesh that includes not only the flesh of bodies, but
also the flesh of the world; a primordial intersubjectivity that subtends cognition,
an ontology that provides the possibility for intersubjective communication. A
close examination of the phenomenology of gestation and adoption provides us
with a simulacrum of this flesh.
MERLEAU-PONTY AND MATERNAL ALTERITY
Within the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty it is through perception that we have
access to the world as a relation of our embodied consciousness with the social
and the organic situation in which we discover ourselves as selves. As situated,
neither our world nor our consciousness is uniquely private, but shared, in that
it is only as both perceiver and perceived that I exist. The substratum of this
interaction is what Merleau-Ponty, in his final unpublished text, The Visible and
the Invisible, names flesh. The flesh is not a genetic but rather a description, a
name for the way that we experience ourselves as both sensing and sensed as
intertwined and reversible within ourselves and with others. Merleau-Ponty
most often exemplifies the flesh by the way our hands, when placed together,
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can alternate between touching and being touched, each in turn but never in
coincidence: “Either my right hand really passes over to the rank of the touched,
but then its hold on the world is interrupted, or it retains its hold on the world,
but then I do not really touch it”.10 The temporal gap between the touching and
being touched is alterity, generated by a doubling of the flesh back upon itself, “by
dehiscence or fission of its own mass”.11
As a primordial intersubjectivity that subtends cognition, it is flesh, within MerleauPonty’s philosophy, that provides the possibility for an inter-communication
with both ourselves and with others that preserves the alterity of the other. The
descriptions of our experiences that we give as subjective are reflections from a
certain vantage, a certain spaciality; they are given from our individual perspective
within the flesh. Like the touching hands, I cannot assume more than one vantage
point at any given time, either I am touching or being touched. Similarly, I cannot
see through the eyes of another and should I attempt to move to their position,
I can only do so through the passage of time. The time that it will take to shift
position opens up an unbridgeable gap between my experience and that of an
other, a radical alterity that can never be closed even though we share the same
world.
Alterity as an immanent experience of ourselves as other, develops sometime
during the second year of life at what is commonly known as the mirror stage.
As we come to recognise ourselves as situated we discover “an anonymity innate
to myself”.12 For Merleau-Ponty, it is through the mutual crossing over and
intertwining of the touching with the tangible and the visual with the invisible,
that difference within the self is discovered through the non-coincidence between
the corporeality which the ‘I” inhabits (ipsiety) and the ideality that I recognise
others are witnessing. Because I cannot see the body which I experientially
inhabit, I come to see myself as situated through the fold or cavity that allows me
to experience myself through the things that I see.13 Therefore, in order for us to
perceive the world through the eyes of a self, we must render invisible the radical
alterity of the other, subsuming her into our corporeal rootedness as an imprint
of the other within the self in a narcissistic moment.
Once again, the flesh we are speaking of is not matter. It is the coiling
over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching
body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches
itself seeing and touching the things, such that, simultaneously as tangible

alterity and the maternal in adoptee phenomenology · 193

it descends among them as touching it dominates them all and draws this
relationship and even this double relationship from itself, by dehiscence
or fission of its own mass.14
Thus, a mature alterity requires the emergence of a double sided otherness
whereby the sense of immanent alterity becomes in some ways the condition for
the possibility for the perception of a transcendent alterity, and visa versa. It is
thus “by a sort of chiasm, [that] we become the others and we become world”.15
Merleau-Ponty first outlines how the infant developmentally comes into herself
in ‘The Child’s Relations With Others’ where he describes how she is born into
syncretism, where self and other are indistinguishable; a bodily possession that he
thought could not begin until around the 8th month of age. 16 Before being able to
phenomenologically engage in the world, the neonate must emerge out of being
the passive beneficiary of experience to possessing herself through the capacity
for embodied intentional movement; a skill which ultimately grounds perception
as situated. The postural schema is the term Merleau-Ponty gives to this selfpossession, this ipsiety, which he argues to be formed in coordinated and familiar
patterns of behaviour, moulded through the sedimentation of proprioceptive and
muscular movement that sit below our level of conscious thought; “that is, a global
consciousness of my body’s position in space, with the corrective reflexes that
impose themselves at each moment, the global consciousness of the spatiality of
my body”.17 Postural schematic movement (often referred to as the body schema)
is what permits us to experience a sense of possession over our bodies as spatially
situated concomitant with and through an experience of alterity.
Although Merleau-Ponty never formally revised this thesis, in his later writings
there are indications of a rethinking of the developmental process outlined in
‘The Child’s Relations with Others’. In the Sorbonne lectures, for instance, he
states that even though the neonate does “not remember the fact of birth, he
conserves a memory of discomfort and can imagine the well-being that preceded
this period”18, a description that suggests that something is carried from the womb
into the world or perhaps even that he was beginning to suspect that intrauterine
life is our first world. The flesh ontology of The Visible and the Invisible, which
Merleau-Ponty describes as “a prototype of Being” also potentially alters the
possibility of an absolute neonatal syncretism.19 Within the flesh the relationship
between ipseity and alterity is indivisible and yet reversible, so rather than ipseity
preceding and developmentally grounding the experience of alterity as it did in
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his earlier work, both ipseity and alterity emerge from an impersonal flesh. Thus,
the infant is born of the intertwining’s of the flesh rather than needing to emerge
from a homogenous existence. The implications here are that alterity is no longer
experientially developed, but rather, discovered as already and always there, a
claim that I will soon show, was a very insightful modification to his understanding
of infant development. However, the key to this modification is in the recognition
that the body schema develops in utero through a maternal alterity and this
Merleau-Ponty could not have known, simply because the empirical research was
not available at that time.
Research that has outlined the way that foetal movement occurs in patterned
ways was one of the agreed findings to emerge out of the 1998 National Institute
of Child Health and Human Development (NICHHD) conference where a crossdisciplinary group of clinicians, neurologists and scientists, came together in
order to consolidate existing findings and to formulate strategies for continuing
research into foetal development. At this conference, there was concurrence
that foetuses display structured bodily movements which they develop through
habituation (or practicing) that begin to appear around the 9th week of gestation.20
These movements progress in complexity, appear to be adapted responses to
the individual foetus’ situation and have neurological import in that specific
coordinated movements appear to play a role in the nervous system development
relevant to that function.21 Foetal movement therefore elicits and nuances
foetal neural function rather than the behaviour flowing out of the required a
priori neurology. By 2008, Graven and Browne identified how researchers now
understand that “the physical, sensory, and social environment of the foetus…[is]
of critical importance in supporting healthy appropriate development of the brain
and neurosensory systems”.22
For a short time, researchers were curious as to how a 9 week old foetus could
possibly move in habituated ways prior to the development of the cortex,
proprioception, and perception, all required for body schematic movement and
reflexive possibilities were examined.23 Proprioception, for example, does not
emerge until the 15th week of gestation, the cortex and perception, not until the
third trimester of pregnancy. The answer was found in 2004, when DiPietro et al.
discovered, by accident, that foetal motor activity affects maternal functioning
such that the mothers’ body unconsciously responds to foetal movement in
a manner that regulates that movement.24 The researchers suggest that the
sympathetic maternal response may be regulating or limiting the degree of
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uterine contraction in relation to foetal movement which in turn regulates and
structures the way that the foetus moves in utero. Early foetal movement patterns
are therefore maternally structured and regulated and this pattern is observable
throughout gestation. Essentially what this means is that foetal movement
patterns which form our most primal neurological structures are moulded into
existence by the maternal body through what Merleau-Ponty would describe as
accouplement—an embodied moving with, or coupling—the functional style of
which has implications for how the child develops neurologically. Breech foetuses
for example, developed normally but nonetheless neurologically differently to
cephalic or downward facing foetuses.25 To at least some extent this maternal
moulding appears to leave an imprint of maternal function.
That gestational maternal emotions may leave their imprint on neonatal neural
structures has also been suggested. Suspicion that this was the case interestingly
dates back to the first world war, when Lester Sontag detected similarities between
maternal emotional characteristics and infant behaviour. In particular, he noted
how mothers whose husbands were at war and at risk of death birthed babies that
seemed to be nervy, restless and difficult to settle.26 More recently, studies have
shown maternal emotions to be deeply implicated in foetal flourishing. Sable et
al., for example, studied the responses to a survey of 2,828 mothers where the
wantedness of a pregnancy was assessed according to whether the pregnancy
was either mistimed and/or unwanted in otherwise healthy women. How each
woman felt about her pregnancy while she was pregnant was also scaled. These
researchers found that “mothers of very low birth weight infants were significantly
more likely than those who had a normal-weight baby to report that they had
felt unhappy about the pregnancy (odds ratio of 1.53)”.27 While one might think
that these outcomes could well be the result of poor personal care due to the
unwanted pregnancy, this was not found to be the case.
Caroline Lundquist, in her paper ‘Being Torn: Toward a Phenomenology
of Unwanted Pregnancy’ describes a similar interrelation. Drawing on the
phenomenon of denied pregnancy, where women do not realise they are pregnant
until they go into labour, she notes how, very often, neonates born out of a denied
pregnancy suffer from low birth weight.28 As Sarah LaChance Adams observes, this
in especially interesting because the human species is one where ordinarily, the
mother will suffer nutrient deprivation in favour of the foetus she carries, yet in
denied pregnancies, the foetus can and often “will be deprived of vital nutrients,
even when there are enough for both”.29 Supporting this claim is a 1994 study of
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denied pregnancy by Brezinka et al. where the histories of twenty seven women
who did not know they were pregnant until term, and when labour contractions
began, were examined. From this small sample, four foetal deaths occurred and
three cases of prematurity. None of the women committed infanticide and all
were otherwise physically healthy. When queried about their denial, most women
reported irregular, sometimes menstruation-like bleedings during pregnancy and
few reported actual symptoms of pregnancy, such as nausea and weight gain.
From this phenomenology it seems difficult to continue to sustain the view that a
pregnant women is a passive receptacle that houses a growing foetus who, like a
parasite, will extract its needs; a trope of compliant maternity that is immensely
ingrain in both the imaginary and metaphors of gestation and birth. Although I was
unable to find any studies on pregnant women whose infants were to be adopted,
one might legitimately wonder if the outcomes would show a particular pattern,
especially as it has been identified, at least in Australia, that the vast majority of
adoptions that historically occurred in this country were coerced if not forced.30
Returning to the empirical account of foetal development, we can see that by the
22nd week of gestation there are marked changes in foetal behaviour. It is at this
developmental stage that we can discern postural schematic movement patterns
that are the result of foetal, rather than maternal, ipsiety. In 2007, Zoia et al.
published the results of their work on intentional or foetal directed movement.31
Their methodology was to examine the kinematic patterns of foetal movements
which showed that by 22 weeks gestation foetal movement regularly involved
tighter and more accurately aimed trajectories toward the target with acceleration
and deceleration phases consistent with the size and sensitivity of what the foetus
was going to touch. Thus, foetal movement by the 22nd week of gestation begins
to display muscular and co-ordinated indicators that are highly suggestive of goal
directed bodily action, and these actions begin at this stage to cut across rather
than move with, both maternal body directives and maternal goal directed action.
It is interesting that it appears to be these movements, which have been observed
in some foetuses as early as 17 weeks, which coincide with the quickening, the
first movements felt by the mother. Also at this time, the hands of the foetus
will now begin to manipulate parts of her body; she begins to trace out her feet,
legs, and genitals, moulding her hands around these parts.32 She explores her own
hands and fingers and grasps and manipulates the umbilical cord. Hand to mouth
movement is very common and mouth exploration appears to stimulate sucking.
She also explores the uterine wall where we can see her hand firstly finding the
wall and then flattening and slowly sliding the palm against the surface.33
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For Merleau-Ponty, the experience of doubly sensing, the sense of touching one’s
self, is a crucial precondition for the development of ipsiety, and here we can begin
to understand how the postural schema emerges in conjunction with, or through
maternal alterity. Through foetal self-exploration proprioceptive perception will
emerge concomitantly with foetal ipseity. In fact, it would seem that the unification
of the body through experience is a condition of foetal experience. Once this basic
self-awareness is apparent, as displayed through goal directed action and selfexploratory behaviour we can say that foetal functioning is consistent with body
schematic behaviour, which is inclusive of proprioceptive awareness by around 26
weeks gestation. Foetal EEG readings then begin and the connection between the
spinal cord and the thalamus completes.34 Following very closely afterwards, at 24
to 26 weeks, thalamocortical connections will grow into the cortex.35 The foetus’
preconscious body schematic substratum, a bodily familiarity which is intentional
(in the Merleau-Pontian sense of bodily intentionality) and of which he or she will
be perceptually familiar in a proprioceptive kind of way, thus emerges by the 26th
week of gestation and will be evident in both the premature and full-term neonate.
So although Merleau-Ponty’s work has proven invaluable in understanding what
this foetal developmental pathway means, he did not, could not, apply his own
philosophy to foetal phenomenology and so although insightful, his account of
infant development nonetheless requires revision, especially in regard to the
timing of some developmental milestones and to the role of the maternal body as
a primal alterity which makes foetal ipsiety possible.36
For Merleau-Ponty, alterity as distinctions between self and other begin to
emerge as a “lived distance” through the creation of a perceptual space that
pushes others farther away, opening a space for the child to exist as individuated.37
This pushing away, for Merleau-Ponty, not only creates the felt sense of spatial
separation, but also an affective space and so, as alterity develops, the space
between the child and others is not just seen but also affectively negotiated.
Applied to foetal phenomenology we can see that the foetus has evolved from
moving with the maternal body in syncretism to a pushing away as intentional
movement that opposes maternal movement, action and emotion. The pregnant
woman, who, prior to the quickening, may well have enjoyed imagining her foetus,
a manifestation that could only ever be temporal, obscure or for some, not there
at all, may now begin to concretely experience this other. In late pregnancy I often
played with my foetus by pushing my stomach in order to illicit a kick back, a game
I have heard many women speak of playing, as is the use of particular movement
patterns or classical music to sooth overactive or nocturnal foetal movement.
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Some women report their foetus waking and moving in response to a call from
their partner or having likes and dislikes of certain sounds. Foetuses also use
maternal responses to modify their own. For example, foetuses have been shown
to adjust their response to unfamiliar noises based on the maternal response to
that noise.38 Through these engagements, the foetus that began as a part of the
maternal body is beginning to create a lived distance within the body of a women
who, in order to go about her day, will continually attempt to incorporate her
foetus into her bodily habituations. This embodied negotiation between mother
and foetus has developmental import because to experience ipsiety the foetus
needs an experiential alterity and so can only gain the lived distance required
for individuation in the presence of a maternal body which is simultaneously a
familiarity and an alterity. At this stage alterity is thus a necessary imperialism
that forecloses the possibility of the foetus as a radical other because during
gestation it is always, at least in part, my body that moves, even if only to regain a
comfortable position that accommodates that foot in my ribs.
A very startling ‘pushing away’ will of course occur at birth when the foetus
becomes the neonate, launched into a world where the body schema that formed
in utero will no longer serve. As Iris Marion Young describes, seeing your baby
for the first time can come as a shock, the reality and relief are enormous.39 It is
a difficult feeling to describe, seeing the reality of what was within you manifest
without. There is recognition yet profound strangeness; it is wonder. Like an
astronaut launched into space, the infant must now learn anew where she is
in this vast spatiality, fluidless, unrestrictive of her movements and devoid of
embodied maternal alterity. How much of the uterine body schema will remain
after induction into this new world is very unclear. However, what has formed
are the cognitive structures that will in some way influence a ‘style’ of being, a
watermark that will stylise the infant’s intersubjective communications in the
world. Neonates who have assumed different positions within the womb will
have different yet identifiably ‘normal’ neurological structures and those who
have shared the womb with a twin, especially one of similar size, will at this early
stage, share both movement and affect similarity.40 In fact, even if these twins are
to be separated at birth, should they meet again in later life they will still share
a striking similarity in their styles of movements and emotional dispositions; a
phenomenon that has also been observed in adoptees reunited in their adult years
with their biological mothers.41
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If the foetal body schema has been moulded through the maternal body then one
might ask about the need for a developmental continuation of this ‘style’ of body
schematic movement after delivery in order to sustain the cognitive development
that the foetus began in utero. Yet, the foetal body schema seems to be situated,
purpose built for the inter-uterine world and not particularly well designed for life
after birth; thus adaption is required whether or not the maternal body schema
remains available.
A more cautious conclusion would be that at least some aspects of the foetal body
schema do remain and these can be seen in the way that infants are calmed by
swaddling and will draw to the mother as a source of familiarity in what is now an
alien world. It also seems to explain some discrepancies in the debate surrounding
neonatal imitation as infants imitate their mothers more readily than strangers
in imitation trials.42 As they grow, securely bonded infants rely on their primary
care giver for ‘reality checks’ modelling their emotional reaction on his or hers;
insecurely attached infants do this less so, instead either self-testing, often to
a dangerous degree, or fearing to move from close proximity to their primary
carers.43 The securely attached child will slowly, over time and with guidance from
her carer, begin to test the world on her own terms, pushing her carer further and
further away, opening a space for herself as a self. Perhaps in this developmental
story, it is not too far a jump to speculate that within the adoptee something of a
trace, a watermark, from the biological mother might be carried into this infant
world interaction, a trace that will leave her always and already a bit further away
than the child who can better synchronise, form a tighter accouplement, with her
primary carer.
Understanding the importance of this primary third, the biological mother, also
leads me to suspect that what might occur at the mirror stage of development
is the internalisation of this primal alterity, what has up until this time been an
external alterity which scaffolds self-experience in the child. As Jack Reynolds
has identified, it is the experience of asymmetry in our relations that founds
our capacities to perceive the absolute alterity of the other as a sphere of
incomprehensibility that emerges out of the asymmetry.44 Thus developmentally,
immanent alterity may not be an internal divergence nor might it result from the
visible body becoming internalised as a captivated body image as Merleau-Ponty
suggests. Rather it may be the discovery that this primary (m)other, who is also a
part of me, bonded to me, folded over me, is a radical other who can leave me and
who I will never truly comprehend. To discover that the mother is an alterity that
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is both within and yet distant from the self could open the fissure, the écart that
would enclose the circuit of reversibility within the self and in doing so permit
entry to the flesh in maturity. To take the mother, my primal alterity into me as an
aspect of me and not of her is to be able to carry forward without her and perhaps
this is why a bonded relation is so important in the first two years of life and less
so beyond those years. It also explains, at least phenomenologically, why it is that
we forget our birth, absorbing the very condition of our existence, our mother’s
gestation, into our individuation as an alterity, an écart, a blindspot. However,
before finalising this argument, I wish to introduce a phenomenology of adoption
into the discussion, to better argue the claim that something from the uterine
environment seems to remain as an aspect of how we develop, and ultimately
experience ourselves as selves.
BONDING, ATTACHMENT AND A PHENOMENOLOGY OF ADOPTION
In March 2012, the Australian NSW Government released a final report into
adoption practices in New South Wales. The report entitled Releasing the past:
Adoption practices 1950-1998 was commissioned in 2000 and outlines the policies
and practices within NSW Hospitals that facilitated the removal of an estimated
150,000 newborn babies, primarily from single mothers during the past halfcentury. The release of the report has sparked a media controversy in Australia,
culminated in more State enquiries, and ultimately was the basis for the 2013
Australian Government apology to those affected by forced adoption. The overall
findings have been that many mothers who gave up their children for adoption
were denied their rights and that many hospital practices of the time were
unlawful and unethical.45 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine
the adoption practices themselves, what is most relevant about these findings is
that the more controversial actions undertaken by adoption workers and hospital
staff were strongly motivated by maternal-infant bonding and attachment theory;
Such theories developed the notion that children could be placed with
other, unrelated families and be ‘saved’. Studies on attachment and bonding
suggested that the child could completely bond to another person, and
suffer no ill effects, provided that person was available shortly after birth.46
Attachment theory was developed by Mary Ainsworth in 1973, as an extension
of the initial work on bonding carried out by Bowlby that I outlined in the
introduction. Through an examination of the qualitatively differing styles of
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bonding behaviours that mothers and infants display post birth, Ainsworth
was able to define different styles of maternal-infant interaction and correlate
those with particular psychosocial outcomes that graduate along a spectrum.47
A secure attachment is characterised by positive psychosocial outcomes in
that the child is able to develop independence while also seeking intimate and
satisfying personal relations and friendships with others. An avoidant attachment
style is correlated with antisocial and often violent behaviours in later adult life
due, according to Ainsworth, to the failure within the child to properly develop
empathic connections to others. Anxious or ambivalent attachment styles display
varying degrees of both a secure and avoidant attachment style. An attachment
style, for Ainsworth is thus a description of the nature and interactive features of
a particular maternal (primary caregiver)-infant bond.48
During the 1970’s Klauss and Kennell took up and moulded the research by Bowlby
and Ainsworth with the aim of bringing into hospital policy and practice a set of
concrete criteria aimed at facilitating the development of secure maternal-infant
bonds.49 Drawing upon animal studies of imprinting Klauss and Kennell argued
the need for a reduction to the crucial time period for secure bonding to around
24 to 48 hours post-birth and developed a set of bonding behaviours that mothers
should implement in order to facilitate a secure ‘at birth’ bonding process.
Controversially, Klauss and Kennell also added to Bowlby’s thesis the need for
a secure bond to be established in order to facilitate good maternal behaviours.
Should a mother or mother substitute, not securely bond with her infant then
she risked neglecting the child in the same way that animal mothers will reject
young who have failed to imprint. Klauss and Kennell also conflated bonding and
attachment theory when they applied Bowlby’s findings of cognitive retardation,
as a potential risk to children who were not securely attached, a finding that
Ainsworth did not report.50 The work of Klauss and Kennell in particular, and
perhaps unfortunately, has been very influential to the policies and practices of
maternity hospitals throughout the western world, even though the basis of their
claims have come under much scrutiny.51
Applied to cases of infant adoption, a theory of bonding as occurring ‘at birth’,
facilitated by certain sorts of behaviours, such as the degree and length of time an
infant experiences skin to skin maternal contact, particularly within the first 48
hours (and beyond), meant that hospitals emphasised procedures that ensured
that the maternal-infant bond did not occur with the biological mother at birth.
As one can image, these were very often traumatic:
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I was pushed down and a pillow was shoved in front of my face. I had no
ideawhy. I thought it must have been because I had given birth to some
kind of freakish monstrosity that they didn’t think I could bare (sic) to
look at … I didn’t know that the pillow in front of your face was a common
hospital policy to prevent mothers from bonding with their babies.52
Yet, despite these extreme precautions, and although adoptive parents report
at times extra-ordinary efforts to bond with their new charges, many adoptees
seem to have experienced difficulties forming secure attachments with their new
parents as per Ainsworth’s criteria. Kirshner, a social worker, describes how there
is typically a shallow quality to the attachments formed by the adopted child,
and a general lack of meaningful relationships in both infancy and their adult
lives.53 The child often reports feeling ‘different’ or ‘empty’ and seeks solitude
from others. Many seem to live in their head, in a fantasy, a phenomenology that
Kirshner came to label ‘the adopted child syndrome’. Triseliotis, a psychiatrist
who studied adoptee phenomenology, quotes adoptee no. 1 from consultation
notes; “I look in the mirror and cannot recognise myself”, and adoptee no. 4;
“I never really felt I belonged. I feel empty and I find it difficult to make friends
or be close to people”.54 In the NSW Australian Government report cited above,
the Committee identifies how, for many adopted people, their identity has been
shaped by the fact of their adoption and many can trace this back to before they
were aware that they were adopted. One adoptee explains how adoption is “at the
core of my very being …It has had more than its fair share into who I am, my life
experiences, my personality, attitudes, feelings about myself and about others”.55
Erika Berzins, to cite a second example, told the Committee how,
Adoption is, and will always be, a part of who I am because it is such a
fundamental part of my life experience, and as such adoption will quite
often play a part in my attitude to values and belief systems in daily life as
well as in response to life’s stresses.56
Andersen, an adoptee himself whose research focuses on the need for adoptees
to search for their origins, suggests that feelings of isolation, of solitude, of never
having been really attached to their adoptive family and never had the feeling
of real belonging, underpin the obsession some adoptees have with finding their
biological mothers, and I would note that it is the mother that adoptees seek.57
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Even more interesting is recent research that allows a comparison between the
psychological outcomes of children who are not biologically related to their
parents. In a 2013 study by Golombok et al., parenting and children’s adjustment
were examined in 30 surrogacy families, 31 egg donation families, 35 donor
insemination families, and 53 natural conception families. Children’s adjustment
was assessed at ages 3, 7 and 10. The results disclosed that although children
born through reproductive donation obtained scores within the normal range,
surrogacy children showed higher levels of adjustment difficulties at age 7 than
children conceived by gamete donation. Thus, “the absence of a gestational
connection to the mother may be more problematic for children than the absence
of a genetic link”58
Foetal developmental phenomenology and adoptee phenomenology, taken
together, raise questions about the place of the biological mother in the
development of our intersubjective relations after our birth and the possibility for
an alternate ‘normal’ developmental alterity—one which holds within the self not
one, but two alterities, or perhaps a primal and a secondary alterity. The question
that interests me most is: is it possible that the echo of which Nydam speaks is a
trace of the biological mother?
Has she left an imprint of herself inscribed in our neurological structures through
the moulding of our movement experienced as an aspect of our identity? Is that
even possible? What does this means for an understanding of the self as forming
from the dehiscence of ipsiety and alterity in the flesh as Merleau-Ponty describes?
If as Merleau-Ponty advocates, being produces itself through a body rooted in the
sensible world, through a chiasmic intertwining of the body with itself, then what
is this echo and why does it result in an embodiment that holds others further
away?
IRIGARAY AND PRIMAL MATERNAL FLESH
Luce Irigaray is interested in the denial of the sexed body within philosophical
theory and to carefully and clearly articulate how sexual difference is foreclosed
by the way that phallocentric philosophers employ metaphors drawn from
the maternal body to ground masculine models of being while simultaneously
disavowing their maternal origins.59 In the case of Merleau-Ponty, mother becomes
nature and maternal nurturance merely another infant-world interaction. As
Tahlia Welsh highlights, Irigarays claim isn’t just that “pregnancy is a subject area
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that can and should be discussed by phenomenology, but rather that pregnancy is
at the heart of the phenomenological project.”60 In this last section I wish to show
both the error and the consequence to understanding humanity as devoid not only
of maternal origin but also of maternal interaction. In keeping with this project,
what I wish to propose is the possibility that Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology is an
absolute appropriation of gestational phenomenology such that the flesh refers to
a phenomenology of gestation that occurs in the bodies of actual women.
Outlining how Merleau-Ponty utilises a whole series of metaphors that are
embedded in and derived from maternity, metaphors that are the conditions
of possibility of his understanding of the flesh, which is itself the condition of
possibility of intersubjectivity, Irigaray identifies the maternal as the unspoken
underbelly of the flesh. Couched in terms of vision, of the strand and the sea
and of immersion and emergence, Merleau-Ponty, according to Irigaray, renders
invisible the womb, leaving the maternal unacknowledged in his flesh ontology:
If it was not the visible that is in question here, it would be possible to
believe that Merleau-Ponty alludes here to intra-uterine life. After all, he
employs the ‘images’ of the sea and strand. Of the immersion and the
emergence? And he speaks of the risk of disappearance of the seer-seeing
and the visible. What doubly corresponds to an existence in the intrauterine nesting: who is still in this night does not see and remains without
any visible ... Especially without memory of that first event where he is
enveloped-touched by a tangible invisible out of which even his eyes are
formed but which he will never see: without seeing, neither visible nor
visibility in this place.61
Also the target of critique for Irigaray is the way that Merleau-Ponty describes
being as self-generating like the embryo, a description which clearly denies
maternal interaction, origins and nurturance. Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm becomes
“another world, another landscape, a topos or a locus of the irreversible”.62 She
identifies in Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions, especially of the visible, a morphology
that echoes the archaic state that one “remembers without remembering
thematically”;63 a dimension of ourselves kept in the depths of our corporeal
prehistory, etched into our bodies as a “watermark”.
Interestingly, the term ‘watermark’ is also used by Merleau-Ponty and although
Irigaray does not specify a connection, the appropriation is not without reference.
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In his course notes from the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty describes the
organism as an “enveloping phenomenon” whereby, “between the microscopic
facts, global reality is delineated like a watermark, never graspable for objectivizingparticular thinking, never eliminable from or reducible to the microscopic” and
how “Alltäglichkeit [everydayness or commonplace] is always in the in-between
world, always as a watermark”. 64 Finally, “[t]he concern is to grasp humanity
first as another manner of being a body—to see humanity emerge just like Being
in the manner of a watermark, not as another substance, but as interbeing, and
not as an imposition of a for-itself on a body in-itself.”65 I have no doubt that
Irigaray’s use of the term ‘watermark’ is a play on these descriptions of humanity
as a watermark of Being; substituting the uterine environment for Being, Irigaray
writes the mothers body back into the picture, rendering this watermark of Being,
a bodily inscription left by the uterine fluid in the womb rather than the imprint
of an anonymous Being.
Although Irigaray’s identification that Merleau-Ponty appropriates the womb in
his flesh ontology, leaving the mother unacknowledged is well placed, I do not
think that this appropriation is as clear a denial of sexual difference as Irigaray
suggests. I think LaChance Adams is correct when she identifies that while it
is true that Merleau-Ponty has no theory of sexual difference, many theorists
critical of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology, including Irigaray, make the mistake of
conflating anonymity with universality. As she identifies, “the body [in MerleauPonty] is always situated within a biological, social, and historical context, even in
its anonymous mode. This means that sex and gender will necessarily be a factor
in embodied experience”66 He also does not completely deny the importance of
the maternal-infant relation. He does after all ask us to “do a psychoanalysis of
Nature: it is the flesh, the mother” and he clearly identifies that the infant’s relation
to the mother is one of total identification in ways that exceed her relation with
others.67
It is not so much the inscription of the mother that is missed, but rather a failure to
grasp the significance of this inscription for developmental alterity. In The Visible
and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty writes that “[i]n spite of all our substantialist ideas,
the seer is being premeditated in counterpoint in the embryonic development;
through a labor upon itself the visible body provides for the hollow whence a
vision will come”68. Also, “[w]hen the embryo’s organism starts to perceive, there
is not a creation of a For itself by the body in itself, and there is not a descent
into the body of a pre-established soul, it is that the vortex of the embryogenesis
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suddenly centers itself upon the interior hollow it was preparing------A certain
fundamental divergence, a certain constitutive dissonance emerges”69 What can
be seen so clearly here is the denial of the necessity of maternal interaction and
engagement with the foetus as necessary for foetal development and flourishing,
reducing the gestational woman to a passive environment within which an active
foetus can do the work of developing within the flesh. This oversight is core, not
only to understanding how foetuses develop but also in acknowledging that the
flesh, as a prototype of Being, does not form through exposure to the ‘natural’
ontological chiasm of the world, but rather through the chiasm that is moulded
by and through a woman’s engagement with foetal matter.
That a pregnant woman is not passive but rather engaged in foetal development
is a position taken up by Frances Gray in her chapter “Original Habitation:
Pregnant Flesh as Absolute Hospitality”.70 Grounding the Levinas/Derrida notion
of unconditional or absolute hospitality in Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology, Gray
argues pregnancy to be the “original host-guest relationship” which she claims
is “ethically primitive”.71 To be pregnant for Gray, is not to be a host who offers
her hospitality to a pre-existing guest as a gift, but rather as an act of embodied
intentionality in a Merleau-Pontian sense of habituated pre-conscious action,
which facilitates an “actualising of being, an enabling of life that has not previously
existed”.72 Gray’s substitution of the Levisonian ‘stranger’ who comes from the
exterior with Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology as a primal intersubjectivity is
insightful. However, her preservation of a foetal emergence as a ‘dehiscence or
fission of its own mass’ and her description of the foetus as a second subject, one
that is “a subject other than, but simultaneously the same as, the woman’s flesh,
a subject who inhabits her body, a separate consciousness created in, and as a
result of her bodily environment” somewhat waters down the degree of maternal
engagement to that of a preconscious bodily facilitation.73 The preservation of
foetal development as a dehiscence that unfolds in a woman’s bodily environment,
albiet a more active environment than Merleau-Ponty proposes, nonetheless
preserves the notion of gestation as devoid of maternal subjectivity, and in doing
so Gray opens her thesis to questions about the development of alterity within
the flesh because without the mother as a primary other, the foetus could not
sustain the ipsiety required to develop consciousness.
In fact Levinas, in a critique of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology has himself
identified that the alterity of the other cannot be accommodated within a flesh
that develops through a relation of reciprocity as a fission.74 For Levinas, while
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dehiscence might explain the presence of an imminent alterity, the alterity I find
within myself, it fails to account for how the infant comes to recognise the radical
alterity of others in the world as different to that found in the self. In fact for
Levinas, the only possibility relies upon a perception rather than an experiential
difference which he argues, ultimately structures the other as a type of knowledge
rather than a felt experience of the unknown. For Levinas, this forecloses the
possibility of an absolute alterity of the other because the other is thereby
reduced to a product of consciousness, an imperialistic projection of ‘me’ as
being like ‘you’.75 Claude Lefort and Dorothea Olkowski have also identified that
a relation of reversibility and dehiscence fails to show how, developmentally, the
child comes to experience the radical alterity of others as different to that within
herself. 76 Each philosopher in their own way insists on the necessity of something
beyond the infant-world relation as necessary to scaffold the development of selfrecognition. For Lefort, what a relation of reversibility and dehiscence cannot
take into account is how, developmentally, alterity is, at least in part, moulded
by a culture. Olkowski’s critique is similar, only for her, it is maternal nurturance
and care that is the missing link, appropriated and reduced to the status of a
‘natural’ event within Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Like Irigaray, she argues that
Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology strategically erases the role of the mother in order
to preserve understandings of development that support a masculine fantasy of
liberal individuation.
There have been several well placed responses to these critiques that support
Merleau-Ponty’s thesis and for the most part the responses adequately support
the specific arguments that these theorists raise. As Gary Madison identifies,
“Otherness … is constitutive of ipseity itself” and so there is no need for a
developmental step, alterity is a discovery, not something that the infant must
cognitively develops. 77 Alterity exists in the incommensurability of our reciprocal
relations, the greater the temporal gap, the écart, the greater the experience of
the unknown. Yet this position, although true, does not adequately respond to
the developmental issue because should the child always and already be for itself
an other, enclosed within what David Michael Levin describes as a “circuit of
reversibilities”78 then when and how did this occur gestationally? Not only is this
question important in terms of understanding the ontology of being that MerleauPonty proposes, it also carries a heavy political weight. Should the zygote be selfforming through ‘dehiscence or fission of its own mass’ and not an aspect of the
maternal body, the maternal flesh, then we will perhaps need to ethically rethink
our conceptions of when it is that we come into being and subsequently the
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policies and practices surrounding abortion and maternal consent to treatments
while pregnant. Should the zygote ever be considered one with the mother then
we must admit a point in development were divergence occurs and then we have
the developmental problem the Lefort and Olkowski discern. The solution I have
shown is that the self is formed within and out of the alterity of our biological
mother, an absolute alterity that is constitutive of the ipseity that our postural
schemas embody; an alterity that will eventually come within but remains outside
of our infantile phenomenal world.
CONCLUSION
In Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, being produces itself through a phenomenal body,
situated in the world, orientated through the mutual crossing of the touching with
the tangible and the visual with the invisible. Through the intertwining of touch
and vision the embryo develops into interaction, not through the dichotomy of
this interaction but as a reversibility situated within the flesh. The flesh is an
excess produced in this intertwining, a generation of difference that is the noncoincidence between corporeality and ideality. The body, for Merleau-Ponty is
a “difference without contradiction, that divergence (écart) between the within
and the without that constitutes its natal secret”.79 Because I am blind to the body
from which I see the world because it is from the body that I see, vision of myself
is a fold or cavity that allows me to see myself only through the things that I
see.80 As Cecelia Sjoholm puts it “[t]he way that we perceive the world, therefore,
presumes the suppression of an invisible other, a radical form of alterity making
its imprint on our corporeal rootedness.81
Many philosophers have criticised Merleau-Pontys philosophy as giving an
inadequate account of radical otherness due to the way we seem to integrate and
suppress the other into our self. For Emmanuel Levinas, this integration forms
a kind of imperialism that denies the capacity to perceive radical alterity. For
Claude Lefort and Dorothea Olkowski, it leaves unaccounted the narrative of
development—just how do we get from syncretic infant experience to the flesh
without social scaffolding? For Irigaray, this understanding of alterity explains
how phallocentrism relies upon the integration and suppression of what should
be a visible other, into our own being so as to sustain a masculine world through
the rendering of this radical other (the other sex), invisible.
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In this paper I have examined the place of alterity in Merleau-Ponty’s flesh ontology
from a different angle again, arguing through a phenomenology of gestation and
adoption that the flesh of which Merleau-Ponty speaks is the flesh of the biological
mother; a real embodied woman whose body has scaffolded the development
of our own. Actual women whose imprint has left us with a watermark that the
adoptee can more easily discern due, most likely, to the radical reformation that
must be undertaken in body schematic development when there are two, rather
than one primary alterities that will need to be internalised, rendered invisible
within the self. As Winterson explains,
That isn’t of its nature negative, the missing part, the missing past, can be
an opening, not a void. It can be an entry as well as an exit. It is the fossil
record, the imprint of another life, your fingers trace the space where it
might have been, and your fingers learn a kind of Braille.82
This Braille, this watermark, the trace of the biological mother that remains,
explains well adoptee phenomenology, while simultaneously creating problems
for bonding at birth theories of infant development. For Merleau-Ponty’s flesh
ontology, from the perspective of thematics, not much needs to change, we do
not even really need to do a psychoanalysis of nature, but rather simply insert the
prefix ‘maternal’ before the term ‘flesh’.
—University of Wollongong
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